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1. Introduction 
Water conservation creates no water. It manages water and water scarcity. Water conservation 
shifts water and water scarcity across people, their water uses, space and time. Water is scarce 
when it is insufficient to satisfy all the valued uses that different people have for water. Valued 
uses include water for drinking, cleaning, industry, transporting waste, recreation, and 
sustaining environmental goods such as habitat, ecosystem and aesthetic services.  
Water scarcity is most obvious in droughts (Kallis, 2008), but scarcity is routine even where 
water appears physically abundant. Water is scarce in Chicago, Illinois, even though it lies 
adjacent to a lake containing more than 1,180 cubic miles of water (Ipi & Bhagwat, 2002). 
Conflicts between people who want water for in-situ uses such water for recreation and 
ecological services and people who want water to withdraw water for people, agriculture 
and industry are common in both humid and arid environments (World Commission on 
Dams, 2000).  
People manage water scarcity through any number of formal organizations and informal 
groupings. These organizations and groups are water management institutions. Legislation, 
law and regulation establish formal institutions. Formal institutions include municipal water 
agencies, water districts, corporations and local governments. Other institutions emerge 
informally out of customs, habits, histories and the politics of water problems. Informal 
institutions include urban water markets that arise in neighborhoods that are not served by a 
municipal network (Crane, 1994) and the patterns of priorities, rights and expectations that 
guide irrigation in traditional societies (Ostrom, 1990). Legislation and law often intervene to 
recognize, modify and transform informal institutions into formal ones (cf. Coman, 2011). 
Different institutions have different effects on water conservation. Within one irrigation 
district, farmers may face ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rules. Use-it-or-lose-it rules force farmers to use 
their water seasonal allocations in a given year or forfeit the unused portion (Spangler, 
2004). In another district, rules may be set up so that farmers may leave unused allotments 
in a reservoir and stored for future use. The two irrigation districts may have the same 
consequences under normal conditions. When a prolonged drought occurs, farmers in the 
first district may watch their crops shrivel from water scarcity, while farmers in the second 
district draw on their banked water and enjoy a normal crop year. 
Rules, fees, restrictions and institutional policies make some actions beneficial and others 
relatively costly. The relative benefits and costs of different actions are economic incentives. 
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Incentives encourage some behaviors and discourage others. Incentives may shape behavior 
in ways that are consistent with objectives but they can also lead to behavior that is entirely 
unexpected.  
Municipal water systems use tariffs to collect the revenue necessary to sustain and expand a 
water system but some tariff choices inadvertently create incentives that weaken financial 
sustainability. For instance, municipal water systems often adopt water tariffs that supply a 
subsistence quantity of water for a payment that is less than the cost of provision. When 
small users predominate, provision below cost eventually makes service financially 
infeasible. Reliable service areas then shrink to service only higher income neighbors and 
the poor are left to purchase water at many times the highest fees charged by the water 
agency (Rogerson, 1996; Komives et al., 2005; Saleth & Dinar, 2001).  
Conservation is effective when incentives are consistent with conservation goals. Economic 
analysis of incentives is part of integrated water management (Snellen & Schrevel, 2004). 
Economic principles help identify the relative values of water in different uses and set up 
processes to balance water uses in ways that are consistent with its scarcity value and 
conservation goals. Analysis of benefits and costs is an inherent part of sustainable 
investments. The water resource investments required to satisfy the thirsts of cities and 
towns or irrigate agriculture cannot be sustained without the careful financial management 
of benefits, costs, revenues and expenditures. 
The objectives of this chapter are to identify the economic principles central to water resource 
management and to examine how these principles are used in the process of designing water 
conservation tariffs and incentives. Tariffs are the pricing mechanisms used by municipal 
water agencies to raise revenues from water use. The analysis examines how tariffs may be 
structured, set and implemented to provide incentives for efficient water conservation. 
The primary economic principles are opportunity cost, demand, deadweight loss, trade, and 
third-party effects. Opportunity costs are the building blocks of economic cost and 
valuation. Opportunity cost is not a physical or accounting concept. Opportunity cost is a 
relative value concept based upon the value of a resource in its next best use. It is the value 
forgone by using a resource in a particular way rather than in its next most valuable use. 
Opportunity cost may be higher or lower than the value of a resource in its current use. 
When the opportunity cost of water is higher than its value in a current use, water is wasted. 
User demands are the sources of water value and deadweight loss is a measure of value lost 
in the misallocation and waste of water. Demand is a relationship between a user’s 
willingness to pay for an additional unit of water and the quantity of water available to that 
user. Demand value is a marginal or incremental concept; it measures the amount a user is 
willing to pay for the last unit of water consumed or used. For example, a thirsty person 
finds the first few sips of water highly valuable, but as a person’s thirst is satisfied, 
additional swallows are successively less valuable. Deadweight loss combines demand 
values and opportunity cost to define an economic index of water waste. 
Trade is a response of economic agents, people and firms, to a wasteful allocation of water. 
Water is wasted when water remains in low value uses while high valued uses go without. 
Economic agents find ways to trade and move water to higher valued uses when it 
physically possible and when they are empowered by law and custom to take ownership of 
the value of water. Trade requires physical infrastructure and the ownership and 
entitlement rules that support trade. Lack of infrastructure and mismatched rules and 
institutions are barriers to trade, standing in the way of an efficient allocation of water. 
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Third-party effects occur when upstream or downstream water users are not taken into 
account in water-use decisions. Water flows and water qualities connect different users in 
complicated and sometimes unforeseen ways. An upstream use of water may affect the 
quantity or quality of water available to downstream users. Water withdrawals by 
municipalities may reduce instream flows for recreation and ecological services. These 
unintended and unaccounted impacts are third-party effects. 
The analysis is developed in the following way. The five primary economic principles are 
first defined and discussed. The subsequent section applies the economic principles to the 
design of efficient water conservation tariffs and to the evaluation of inefficient tariffs. The 
next section evaluates the tariff structures and tariff levels that are in use by municipalities 
around the world. The analysis indicates that very much remains to be done. Municipal 
systems contain large reservoirs of wasted water, reservoirs waiting to be tapped by 
efficient water conservation policies. The analysis concludes with three strategies to 
implement efficient water conservation incentives in residential water systems. 
2. Five economic principles in water conservation 
Water is a scarce resource. Economic scarcity means that there is not enough water available 
to meet all the wants and needs that people have for water. Economic scarcity is defined in 
reference to people’s needs and wants rather than to physical availability. Needs and wants 
are defined broadly, to include the environmental and ecological services that make life 
possible and, so often, enjoyable. With all scarce goods, some wants and needs are unmet.  
Scarcity makes water valuable. The values that people place on water make water worthy of 
considerable attention. When water is well-managed, water values enable the large 
investments necessary to ensure that essential values are protected and less essential values 
are supported with suitable quantities of water. When water is poorly managed, critical 
values are ignored and water is wasted in uses with little or no value. 
Economic principles play a role in understanding and measuring water values. These 
principles make it possible to develop and evaluate water conservation incentives. At times, 
analysis of water values and incentives is highly technical and nuanced. The economic 
principles developed below are the basic concepts used to evaluate economic incentives and 
the decisions they motivate. 
2.1 Opportunity cost  
Using scarce water always has a cost. The scarcity of water means that there is always some 
other way the water may be used—some next best use. The cost is the value of the water in 
its next best use. The value forgone in the next best use is the opportunity cost of water. 
Opportunity cost is the fundamental principle of economic cost. 
Opportunity cost varies across time and space. Time is important since water uses vary in 
quality, type and value over time. The values of water in agriculture rise and fall as seasons 
and growing conditions change. In winter, agricultural water values may be close to zero. 
Irrigation values rise substantially during the growing season, and especially during a 
drought. Water for outdoor recreation may show similar seasonal patterns. Water values 
also vary across space. Inability to transfer water across space due to lack of infrastructure 
or to legal barriers causes water values to diverge spatially. Divergent values are an 
incentive for human action to move water from a low value location to a high value location. 
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Divergent water values can lead to epic-scale investments in political power, litigation and 
infrastructure (Libecap, 2007). 
Opportunity cost varies also with the quantity of water considered. The first unit of water 
transferred to the next best use has the highest value. Subsequent units transferred to the 
next best use have successively lower values. Marginal opportunity cost is the value of 
transferring a particular unit of water from its current use to its next best use. Marginal 
opportunity cost tends to fall as successive units of water are transferred from the current 
use to the next best opportunity. 
2.2 Demand 
Water demand is a relationship between water quantities and the amount users are willing 
to pay per-unit of water. The law of demand says that the amount a user is willing to pay 
per-unit declines as the amounts purchased increase. This means that there is an inverse 
relationship between willingness to pay and the amount of water available for use.  
Household water use illustrates the law of demand. A small amount of water is highly 
valuable since it satisfies basic needs such as thirst and personal hygiene. Additional water 
for cooking and cleaning also has a high value, but not quite as high as the first few units of 
water used for drinking and hygiene. Household water values decline much further for 
values associated with gardening and lawn irrigation. Too much water may have negative 
values for a household—a leaky pipe may flood a basement and too much irrigation may 
destroy a productive agricultural field.  
Water demand is represented mathematically with quantity as a function of price. Water 
demand for the ith water user is a function ݓ௜ = ݂ሺݐ, ߙሻ where ݓ௜ is a quantity of water 
demanded at price or volumetric charge, ݐ, ݂ሺ∙ሻ is the demand function and ߙ represents 
other factors beside the volumetric charge that shift quantity demanded. The law of demand 
means that quantity demanded declines as the volumetric charge increases, so 
ௗ௪೔ௗ௧ = ௗ௙ௗ௧ < Ͳ. 
Demand shifters, ߙ, include variables such as user income, user age, seasons, weather, 
capital investments such as housing and acreage, water-use technology, regulatory 
restrictions, and information campaigns encouraging water conservation (Worthington & 
Hoffman, 2008). Households with greater incomes may use more water due to using more 
water-using appliances, larger gardens and lawns, swimming pools and other such uses. 
Water demand may shift seasonally since irrigation of gardens and lawns is more valuable 
in dry seasons than in wet seasons. Other factors that shift demand may include house and 
yard size, installation of water-saving technology, and knowledge of water saving strategies. 
Such demand shifters are the focus of non-tariff approaches to water conservation.  
Water demands are estimated for a wide range of users, uses and aggregates of users and 
uses. Demands relevant to water conservation include household demands, crop demands, 
farm demands, industry demands, instream use demands and aggregates thereof, such as 
urban, agricultural and industrial demands. A common element is each of the latter 
demands is the law of demand, the inverse relationship between value as measured by 
willingness to pay and water quantity. 
The law of demand is central to water conservation tariffs and incentives. The law of 
demand indicates that as volumetric tariff charges increase, the quantity of water demanded 
declines. Users adjust their water use downward in response to a volumetric charge 
increase. Users reduce their water use until the value they place on the last unit of water 
used or consumed is equal to the volumetric charge.  
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The opposite behavior happens with a reduction in a volumetric charge. A reduction in a 
volumetric charge means that the value that a user places on water exceeds the volumetric 
charge and the user responds by increasing water use. Water use increases until the user’s 
valuation of the last unit of water is once again equal to the volumetric charge. 
The responsiveness of demand to changes in a volumetric charge is summarized with a 
number called ‘elasticity’. Elasticities are numbers that describe the percentage change in 
water use resulting from a one percent change in the volumetric charge. Elasticities are 
negative due to the law of demand. Estimated elasticities for residential water use tend to lie 
in a range from -0.3 to -0.6 with some reports of -0.1 or less (Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Nauges & 
Whittington, 2010; Worthington & Hoffman, 2008). An elasticity -.4 implies that water use 
declines by 4% for a 10% increase in a volumetric charge and by 40% for a 100% increase in a 
volumetric charge.  
Elasticities are also estimated for demand shifters, ߙ, and especially for the income levels of 
residential users. Income elasticities are useful in understanding how water use is likely to 
change with growth in incomes and with changes in the mix of income groups within 
service areas. An income elasticity of .4 means that annual growth in income of 4% is likely 
to increase water use by 1.2%. If such income growth continues over a decade, incomes rise 
by 34% and water use by 13.6%. 
There are two important ranges of demand elasticities. Demand response is inelastic when a 
one-percent change in a volumetric charge or a shifter results in less than a one-percent change 
in water use. Demand response is elastic when a one percent change in price or a shifter results 
in a greater than one-percent change in water use. Residential water demands tend to be 
inelastic with respect to both volumetric charge and income (Dalhuisen et al., 2003).  
2.3 Deadweight Loss 
Deadweight loss is an economic measure of waste. Water is wasted when its value in a 
current use is less than its opportunity cost. Deadweight loss is the difference between 
current use value and opportunity cost when opportunity cost exceeds current use value.  
Figure 1 illustrates deadweight loss with a simple case where a fixed amount of water is 
allocated between two users, person A and person B. The length of the horizontal axis 
represents the total amount of water available for use, 100 units. Water can be allocated to 
either A or B. Water allocated to A, ܳ஺, leaves 100 units minus ܳ஺, for B’s use so ܳ஻ = ͳͲͲ −ܳ஺. At the left-hand corner of the diagram, A gets zero units of water and B gets 100 units. 
Moving from left to right along the axis, A gets more water and B gets less until A receives 
100% of the water and B gets 0% at the right-hand corner of the figure.  
A’s demand curve is DA. DA slopes downward from left to right since A’s value of the last 
unit of water consumed declines as A uses more and more water. Conversely, B’s demand 
curve slopes upward from left to right as B gets less and less water. B’s valuation of the last 
unit of water increases as B gets less and less water.  
Water is wasted when its value in a current use is less than its opportunity cost. This means 
that water is wasted when A gets all the water since A’s demand curve—the values that A 
places on successive units of water--lies below B’s demand curve when A’s allocation 
exceeds 55 units. The triangular area between the two demand curves from 55 to 100 units of 
water is the value forgone by giving A all the water. The triangle area is the deadweight loss 
of the allocation. 
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Fig. 1. Water Demand, Opportunity Cost and Allocation 
Deadweight loss is the potential benefit of reducing A’s use so that B can use more. For 
instance, by reallocating 45 units to B, the entire deadweight loss triangle from A’s overuse 
is eliminated. When A uses 55 units and B uses 45 units, the demand values for the last unit 
of water used by each party are equal. Once the demand values are equal, there is no 
additional gain to letting B use more water. Letting B use more water than 45 units moves 
into the region where B’s demand values are lower than A’s.  
Deadweight loss, wasted water, and inefficiency also result from allocating all water to B’s 
use. At the lower left-hand corner of the the Figure 1, A gets no water and A’s demand 
value exceeds B’s demand value. Moreover, A’s demand values exceed B’s for all units of 
water up to A’s use of 55 units and B’s use of Ͷͷ = ͳͲͲ − ͷͷ units. When A uses 55 units 
and B uses 45 units demand values for the last unit of use are again equal. The deadweight 
loss of B using all the water is the triangular area between the demand curves from 0 to 55 
units. Having A use more than 55 units would move the allocation into a region of 
deadweight loss, where B’s values for water exceed A’s values.  
There is no wasted water when there is no way to reallocate water use and improve the 
values associated with the allocation. Economic waste of water is zero only where the 
demand values are equal. In Figure 1, demand values are equal where A uses 55 units and B 
uses 45 units. At the latter allocation, zero water is wasted since current use exceeds 
opportunity cost and there is no deadweight loss.  
Economics defines zero economic waste as an efficient allocation. An allocation that is not 
efficient is inefficient. An inefficient allocation wastes water and results in a non-zero 
deadweight loss. 
Water conservation seeks to reduce waste and improve the efficiency of water use. A 
reduction in wasted water creates benefits by reducing deadweight loss and improving 
economic efficiency. A situation is fully efficient when opportunity cost is less than or equal 
to the current use value for all water uses. Full efficiency with zero waste and zero 
deadweight loss is unlikely in practice, but research shows that there are many practicable 
ways to reduce waste and improve efficiency. 
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2.4 Water trading 
Water waste and inefficiency create a powerful economic incentive to reallocate and 
conserve water. For all the inefficient and wasteful allocations in Figure 1, the value of the 
last unit of water used is less than the value of an additional unit of water in the forgone use. 
For instance, when an allocation favors A with 100 units of water use, the value to B for a 
single unit of water exceeds the loss to A of giving up that single unit. A and B have an 
incentive to trade water for money or water. Trading isn’t strictly in terms of water and 
money. Any good could stand in for money as long as it is valued and can be transferred to 
the ownership of the party that gives up a little water.  
Starting from an allocation where A uses all the water, A and B can realize mutual gains if 
they voluntarily transfer a portion of A’s water from A to B. If A is altruistic and gains value 
equivalent to B’s value from merely knowing that B has water, A can simply give B some 
water. A second possibility is for B to compensate A by paying A for the loss of water. A 
and B can trade water for an amount of money somewhere between B’s high value and A’s 
low value. Trading at an intermediate value creates mutual benefits for both A and B. A 
trade of one unit of water from A to B eliminates the deadweight loss incurred through A’s 
low valued use of that unit of water.  
A and B have an incentive to continue trading water as long as there is a deadweight loss 
and a potential mutual benefit. By voluntarily continuing to trade, A and B eventually arrive 
at the efficient allocation of water shown in Figure 1 where A uses 55 units and B uses 45 
units. A and B have the same incentives to trade when they begin with B using 100 units of 
water. In each case they trade to the efficient allocation where the demand values are equal, 
A uses 55 units, and B uses 45 units. Voluntary trading away from the efficient use 
allocation is not possible since once at the efficient allocation, opportunity cost is less than a 
user’s demand value. 
Reduction in water waste through voluntary trading is often difficult to achieve. In many 
situations, water customs, water rights law and lack of physical infrastructure make trade 
impractical or impossible (Slaughter, 2009). Trade in water requires a form of ownership 
consistent with trading. A buyer expects a transfer of a legal right to hold and use the water. 
Defining and implementing tradable ownership rights is often a slow and difficult process 
(Allan, 2003). 
Trade in water also requires a water resource infrastructure. Water is physically heavy and 
difficult to transfer from one place and time to another. Water transfers require physical 
transport and storage facilities. These facilities become more complicated and costly with 
the complexity and scale of spatial and temporal transfers.  
Water trading also requires an institutional infrastructure to identify water resources, to 
account for their location in space and time, and to define and enforce rules and procedures. 
A crucial economic feature of such trading rules and procedures is the degree that they 
distribute or consolidate resource ownership. Mistaken efforts in ‘privatization’ consolidate 
water treatment and distribution systems in a single owner. Single owners are all too likely 
to exploit their position as monopolists by restricting water access, raising water prices and 
increasing inefficiency and waste. 
The cost and difficulty of developing efficient water trading infrastructure limits the 
practicability of water trading in many situations. Trade seems most feasible in dry regions 
around the world where water is particularly scarce, the opportunity cost of waste is high 
and the costs of physical transfer are relatively low (Grafton et al., 2010; Ruml, 2005).  
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2.5 Third-party effects 
Water use and conservation involves decisions about how, when and where water is used. 
Third-party effects arise when such decision directly affect water availability to services and 
people that are not directly involved in a decision. Third-party effects are also denoted as 
externalities and spillovers and are relatively common in water management (Slaughter, 
2009) 
Water withdrawals from a water body potentially affect other water users. Water 
withdrawn from a reservoir for municipal use and irrigation may have negative impacts on 
boating, fishing and valued ecosystems. If so, these are negative third-party effects on 
boaters, fishers and those who value the ecosystem services. Negative third-party effects can 
also arise from irrigation drainage, from the toxins and pathogens in municipal and 
industrial wastewater, and from ground and surface water depleted by overuse.  
Third-party effects may also be positive and beneficial. Construction of a reservoir funded 
by irrigators and municipal users may have positive third-party effects on boaters, fishers 
and ecosystem services. Treatment of urban wastewater may result in a recyclable product 
for irrigation and industrial cooling.  
3. Efficient water conservation tariffs 
Municipal water tariffs are the rates, charges and fees that municipal water systems charge 
users for water provided. Municipal tariffs are different from the prices that emerge from 
large markets. Market prices are typically the result of many buyers and sellers negotiating 
trades over time. Municipal water tariffs are usually set in an administrative and political 
setting. Administrative tariffs may be highly durable and may reflect political pressures 
more than the opportunity costs of the resources, including water, that are used in water 
treatment and distribution. Water is wasted and financial sustainability is threatened when 
tariff revenues do not cover costs. 
Municipal water tariffs support water conservation to the extent that they encourage 
efficient water use and discourage waste. At the same time, efficient tariffs do not encourage 
overinvestment in water conservation and hoarding. Water conserving tariffs are just high 
enough to recover the economic costs of water provision, including the opportunity cost of 
water withdrawn from other uses and wastewater returned from the water system to the 
hydrological cycle.  
3.1 Efficient water tariffs 
Efficient water conservation tariffs have three attributes. First, they are simple enough that 
they can be accurately communicated to and understood by water users. Water users may 
not know how much they are charged for water use and only a subset of those who do 
know can work through the details of how reduced water use may save them money 
(Whitcomb, 2005). Rates can be complex and confusing even for an informed user (Martins 
et al., 2007; Dziegielewski et al., 2004).  
Water tariffs need to be simple enough so that users can see how they can save money by 
reduced water use, careful conservation and investment in water saving technology. Gaudin 
(2006) finds that less than 20% of water utilities inform water users of the tariff schedule in 
water bills. When tariff details are clearly communicated and explained, water use falls by 
an average of 30% (Gaudin, 2006).  
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Second, water conservation tariffs provide the revenue necessary to cover the economic 
costs of water provision. This means, in part, that water conservation prices bring in enough 
revenue to pay the full financial costs of water provision, including the capital, maintenance, 
operating and administrative costs.  
The financial opportunity costs of municipal water provision may be broken down into two 
components. The first is a fixed cost component, ߶, that equals the financial costs of 
establishing a water and wastewater infrastructure of a given capacity. Fixed cost includes the 
capital investments costs of reservoirs, diversions, pipelines and treatment plants. The scale of 
the latter investments tends to be relatively fixed by their design capacity and varies relatively 
little with water volumes within the design capacities. Fixed financial cost also includes other 
costs that remain fixed within broad volume intervals. The latter include the overhead cost of 
an administration, accounting, and billing insofar as these do not vary with volumes 
processed. Fixed cost may be adjusted to account for new capital investments (Griffin, 2001).  
The second portion of financial opportunity cost varies with the volume of water and 
wastewater processed. Variable costs arise from the labor, equipment, chemicals and energy 
required to treat, distribute, and maintain service quality and reliability as larger volumes of 
water and wastewater are processed. The variable cost component is denoted, ߜݓ. Variable 
cost increases proportionately with total water use within the system, ݓ = ∑ ݓ௜ே௜ୀଵ , where ܰ 
is the number of water users, ݅ = ͳ,… , ܰ. The factor of proportionality,	ߜ, is the financial 
opportunity cost of providing an additional unit of water and wastewater services. It is the 
marginal financial opportunity cost of water.  
The total financial cost,	݂ሺݓሻ, is the sum of fixed and variable costs, ݂ሺݓሻ = ߶ + ߜݓ. Total 
financial opportunity cost is the market cost of capital and purchased inputs used in 
processing municipal water and wastewater services. They are ‘financial’ in a sense that 
they show up explicitly as expenditures in a municipal system’s financial accounts. When a 
municipal system purchases water inputs and pays to eliminate wastewater impacts, the 
financial costs shows in the system’s accounts. However, explicit payments for raw water 
and pollution impacts are often not made. In the latter case, raw water and wastewater incur 
an unpaid opportunity cost. 
The third attribute of an efficient water conservation tariff is that it accounts the non-
financial opportunity costs of raw water inputs and wastewater outputs. These non-
financial costs may have a fixed component associated with the ecological and 
environmental services forgone due to investments such as reservoirs and pipelines. In an 
efficient tariff, these non-financial fixed costs are added into ߶ along with financial 
opportunity costs.  
The greater share of opportunity cost is likely to vary with the quantity of water provided 
and wastewater returned to the hydrological system. Variable opportunity cost includes 
unpaid values of raw water when raw water would have otherwise been used in some other 
economic activity such as agriculture. Additional sources of potential opportunity costs are 
forgone instream uses, changes in ambient water quality due to wastewater effluents, and 
forgone future use when current use depletes future supplies. The latter opportunity cost 
arises in the case of reservoirs and groundwater reserves when increases in current use 
significantly increase future scarcity.  
Opportunity costs that vary with the volume of water and wastewater are denoted ߣݓ. The 
factor of proportionality, ߣ,	indicates how opportunity cost increases with an additional unit of 
water and wastewater services; it is the marginal opportunity cost of water and wastewater 
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provision. The full economic cost, ݁ሺݓሻ, of water and wastewater services is the sum of 
financial and non-financial opportunity costs, ݁ሺݓሻ = ݂ሺݓሻ + ߣݓ = ߶ + ߜݓ + ߣw. The 
economic cost has two components, a fixed cost, ߶, and a variable cost, ߜݓ + ߣݓ = ሺߜ + ߣሻݓ. 
Fixed and variable economic costs are sums of financial and non-financial opportunity cost. 
The sum is made explicit in the formulation because variable cost turns out to be central to 
water conservation incentives. The sum of the two variable cost parameters, ߜ + ߣ, is the full 
economic cost of providing an additional unit of water within a municipal system of a given 
capacity; it is the marginal economic cost of providing processed water and wastewater.  
A water conservation tariff is efficient in the sense that it encourages no wasted water. An 
efficient tariff communicates the full economic cost of water and wastewater services. Since 
economic costs have fixed and variable components, an efficient tariff reflects both 
components: the variable cost of water and wastewater services provided to a user and the 
user’s share of fixed cost (Coase, 1946).  
The first component of an efficient tariff is a volumetric charge. An efficient tariff levees a 
volumetric charge, ߬, equal to the economic cost of an additional unit of water and 
wastewater services. The efficient volumetric charge per unit of water is ߬ = ߜ + ߣ. For the 
delivery of ݓ௜, the ith user pays ߬ݓ௜ = ሺߜ + ߣሻݓ௜. By charging ߬ per-unit to each user, a 
municipal system recovers the full variable economic cost, ሺߜ + ߣሻݓ, of providing N users 
with water and wastewater services, ݓ = ∑ ݓ௜ே௜ୀଵ . 
Empirical analysis indicates that users respond to volumetric charges by reducing water use 
as the charge per unit increases (Nataraj & Hanemann, 2011). An efficient volumetric charge, ߬ = ߜ + ߣ, presents water users with the full incremental economic cost of their water use 
decisions. As the law of demand indicates, a user’s own valuation of water is initially large 
for the first few units of water. When a user’s own valuation is greater than the efficient per-
unit charge, ߬, the user increases water use.  
As water use increases, demand values decline by the law of demand. Through error or 
neglect, use may increase to the point where the user’s own valuation is less than ߬. When 
this shows up in a billing cycle, the user finds it worthwhile to cut back on water use to the 
point where the demand value is equal to the per-unit charge. This is an efficient level of 
water use where the demand value is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of water. An 
efficient volumetric charge eliminates wasted water. 
An efficient volumetric charge also gives users an incentive to find and install water-saving 
technologies. When a technology saves water at a per-unit cost less than ߬, the user benefits by 
installing the technology. Volumetric charges different from ߬ leads users to make wasteful 
decisions. A volumetric charge less than ߬ results in too much water use and too little 
investment in water-saving technologies. A charge greater than ߬ makes the opposite error: too 
little water is used and too much is invested in uneconomic water-saving technology. 
The second component of an efficient tariff is a fixed charge. The fixed tariff component 
recovers the portion of the economic fixed cost, ߜ that is not covered by volumetric revenue, ߬ݓ. A portion of the latter revenue covers the variable financial cost, ߜݓ that is paid to 
acquire labor and other resources necessary for operating the system. The second portion of 
volumetric revenue is the opportunity cost, ߣݓ, of resources used but not paid in a financial 
transaction.  
Opportunity cost revenue, ߣݓ, reduces the economic fixed cost that needs to be supported 
by additional revenue. The amount of the net fixed cost, ߟ = ߜ − ߣݓ, is positive when ߜ > ߣݓ and zero, negative when ߜ < ߣݓ and zero when ߜ = ߣݓ (Hall 2009). When the net 
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fixed cost is positive, the system requires an additional fixed charge to cover the remaining 
cost. When net fixed cost is negative, the system receives revenues in excess of its financial 
costs and may return a fixed rebate to water users. When the net fixed cost is zero, there is 
no need for a fixed charge.  
Economic principles allow considerable leeway in determining how net fixed costs are 
allocated across users, though two constraints apply. Let ߟ௜ be the fixed charge to the ith 
water user. The first constraint is that users’ fixed charges add up to the total net fixed cost, ߟ = ∑ ߟ௜ே௜ୀଵ , where ߟ௜ is the fixed charge paid or fixed charge rebate received by the ith water 
user. The second constraint is that the ߟ௜ is unrelated to the volume of water used. When ߟ௜ 
is correlated with ݓ௜ then the fixed payment alters the way a user views the volumetric 
charge. Rather than viewing the volumetric charge solely in terms of ߬, the user views the 
volumetric charge as higher or lower consistent with the degree of correlation with ߟ௜ and 
whether ߟ௜ is a payment or a rebate. 
The fixed charge allows municipalities to address fairness and equity without altering the 
water conservation properties of an efficient volumetric charge. Fixed charge schedules 
might address fairness and equity with a variety of measures that are correlated with equity 
considerations such as income, but not directly correlated with adjustments in water use. 
Baberan and Arbues (2009) suggest household size as a factor. Other possible measures 
include ߟ௜ differentiated by class of user such as industrial, commercial and residential; by 
zoning and land use categories; by interior areas of homes; or by neighborhood 
development vintage.  
An efficient water conservation tariff is composed of a fixed and volumetric charge, ߟ௜ + ߬ݓ௜. 
The fixed component provides the revenues required to (a) cover net fixed cost and (b) 
address fairness and equity. The volumetric charge, ߬, is set to equal the marginal financial 
and non-financial opportunity costs of water and wastewater provision. The volumetric 
charge communicates efficient water conservation incentives to all water users.  
3.2 Inefficient water tariffs 
Municipal water systems adopt and maintain rate structures for a variety of reasons 
unrelated to water conservation. Common tariff structures include uniform volumetric rates 
without fixed charges, flat rates, decreasing block rates, increasing block rates and different 
combinations of volumetric, flat, decreasing block and increasing block rates. Except for 
combined flat and volumetric rates, each of these alternative tariffs have a structure that 
discourages efficient water conservation and encourages inefficiency and waste. 
A uniform rate without a fixed charge is a charge per-unit of service received by a water 
user. A uniform rate is a volumetric charge since the total amount paid by a user is the 
product of the per-unit charge and the volume of water used. With positive fixed costs, a 
uniform rate set to cover the full economic costs of water and wastewater use is greater 
than the efficient volumetric charge. Such a rate is too high for efficient water 
conservation. An excessive uniform rate causes users to forego water uses that are 
beneficial and wastes time, money and resources in inefficient water saving. A uniform 
rate equal to an efficient volumetric charge presents users with efficient incentives for 
water conservation, but fails to cover net fixed costs. Ignoring positive net fixed costs 
makes the system financially unsustainable, an all too common problem in municipal 
systems (Banerjee et al., 2008; Hoehn and Krieger, 2000; Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2009). 
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A flat rate is a fixed charge per connection without a volumetric charge. Flat rates may be set 
to cover the economic cost of municipal water and wastewater. In systems without user 
metering, a flat rate is the only feasible alternative (OECD, 2009). The water conservation 
flaw in flat rates is that they place no cost on an additional unit of water. The user’s cost of 
an additional unit of water is zero, so water is treated accordingly. Users make decisions 
accordingly, using water as if it is free rather than scarce and valuable.  
Flat rates result in significant water waste and large economic costs. Users not only use 
water inefficiently, they also find it financially unwise to prevent ‘unintentional’ waste. 
Leaky valves go unrepaired and outdoor irrigation is left unmonitored—wastewater 
merits no attention when more can be obtained without cost. Moreover, much of the 
wasted water flows through the sewer and wastewater system, unnecessarily increasing 
wastewater treatment costs and the third-party costs of pollution and pollution-caused 
disease. 
A decreasing block rate is a set of volumetric charges that decrease in a staircase fashion as 
water use increases. Levels of water use are divided into intervals called blocks that are the 
lengths of the steps. The height of a step is the volumetric charge. The highest volumetric 
charge is at the top of the staircase and volumetric charges decrease with each step or block 
as water use increases. A water user using enough water to cover two blocks pays two 
different rates for water use; one for the first block of water use and a lower rate for the 
second block. A user whose water quantity covers three blocks pays three different rates for 
water. The latter user pays the highest rate for the first block, an intermediate rate for the 
second, and the lowest rate for the third.  
A decreasing block rate can cover economic costs, but it is does not encourage efficient 
water use and conservation. At most, no more than one of the blocks can have a volumetric 
rate consistent with efficient water conservation. The other blocks encourage too little or too 
much conservation. Oddly, the decreasing block structure gives individuals using the least 
amount of water the largest incentives for water conservation. Those using the most water 
face the weakest incentive for cutting back.  
An increasing block rate is a set of volumetric charges that increase in a staircase fashion. The 
lowest charge occurs at the first block and the largest charge occurs at the last block. Like the 
decreasing block rate, an increasing block rate covering economic or financial cost is 
unlikely to send efficient water conservation signals to any block. Users at the first block 
face too small an incentive for water conservation and those at the last block invest too 
much in water conservation. 
Increasing blocks are often adopted based on claims of fairness and equity. The claim rests 
on the idea that the poorest and most disadvantaged groups are likely to use the least water, 
so the initial low rate lowers the cost sustained by these users (OECD, 2009). Research 
indicates that the fairness and equity claim is not valid. Poor and disadvantaged users fail to 
benefit, even in cities where fairness and equity appear most needed. Increasing rates tend 
to be regressive for two reasons. First, the initial block rate is paid by all users, rich, poor 
and middle-income, so there is no relative gain to the poor. Second, poorly financed 
municipal systems often exclude the poor from water service, so the benefit of low rates 
goes entirely to the middle-income class and rich (Komives et al., 2005). The poor are all too 
often left outside the municipal system where water costs can be 2 to 60 times greater than 
municipal rates (Saleth & Dinar 2001).  
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The final category includes a wide-range of tariff structures that combine uniform, flat, 
decreasing and increasing rates in different ways for different user types. Tariffs can also be 
adjusted by seasons of the year such as summer or during droughts. The essential problem 
with these combined structures is that, like their component parts, they fail to present users 
with simple, understandable and correct incentives for efficient water conservation. The 
result of such mixed signals is wasted water with all its costs of unnecessary water and 
wastewater treatment, foregone beneficial uses, and ecological damages.  
4. Tariff incentives for residential water conservation 
Residential water tariffs are well recognized as a water conservation tool (State of 
California, 2008; Beecher et al., 2005). This section examines whether existing tariffs 
encourage water conservation. The section begins with a brief comparison of experience 
with tariff and non-tariff approaches to water conservation. Tariff structures and 
volumetric charges used by water systems around the world are then reviewed to 
determine the extent that existing tariffs are efficient. Most tariffs appear too low to 
incorporate non-financial opportunity costs.  
4.1 Non-tariff tools for water conservation 
Water managers often favor non-tariff tools for water conservation. Non-tariff approaches 
include informational campaigns, technology rebates, voluntary restrictions and mandatory 
restrictions accompanied by legal penalties. Research indicates that most informational 
campaigns and voluntary restrictions are unreliable as conservation tools (Olmstead & 
Stavins, 2009), though some well-structured informational campaigns may reduce water use 
by up to 8% (Renwick & Green, 2000). Rebates on efficiency toilets show no effect on water 
use (Renwick & Green, 2000). 
Mandatory restrictions enforced with strong penalties can be effective where penalties are 
strictly enforced and violators are made to pay. In Aurora, Colorado, restrictions with 
penalties reduced summer water use by up to 26% (Kenny et al., 2008). Renwick and Green 
(2000) study California water systems serving 8 million people and find that restrictions 
with penalties reduce water use by 19 to 29%. However, a portion of the public vocally 
resists restrictions and fines. Imperfect monitoring, uneven enforcement and criminalization 
of civil behavior—such as caring for one’s property—can result in public controversy 
(Atwood et al., 2007). Also, restrictions may reduce a targeted behavior, but they do nothing 
to encourage waste reduction in unrestricted uses.  
Water conservation tariffs may also generate public resistance. No one likes a cost increase. 
Worse yet, however, is going without water service as millions do when inadequate tariffs 
fail to cover even financial costs (Nauges & Whittington 2009) or when excessive water 
withdrawals threaten instream recreational and environmental resources (Hickey & Diaz 
1999).  
The structure of efficient conservation tariffs allows costs to be distributed in ways that 
increase the degree of public acceptance. First, an efficient volumetric rate is fair since it 
addresses the full economic cost of using an additional unit of water. With an efficient rate, 
no one gets away by not paying the incremental cost of water. Second, the fixed charge can 
be adjusted to address equity concerns across users and to avoid putting excess burdens on 
those unable to pay. 
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4.2 Water tariff structures used by municipal systems 
Efficient water conservation tariffs have both an efficient structure and an efficient level. The 
efficient structure has two parts, a volumetric charge and a fixed charge. The analysis 
examines data on tariffs to determine the extent that water tariffs in use diverge from an 
efficient structure. 
A 2010 water tariff survey by Global Water Intelligence [GWI] describes water tariff 
structures and levels for 276 water systems worldwide. Table 1 lists the number of survey 
responses by region and the percentage distribution of five tariffs. Responses from Asian 
water systems comprise about one-third of the sample. European systems provide an 
additional third of responses. The remaining third of responses were obtained from water 
systems in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), North America and South 
America, with North American systems providing about 12% of the responses. 
 
Regiona 
Water 
Systems 
(#) 
Regional Rate Structure Distribution (%)a 
Vol. Flat I Block D Block Efficient 
No 
Data 
All 276 23 3 50 2 20 2 
Africa 18 0 0 94 0 6 0 
Asia 94 41 3 50 0 5 0 
Europe 87 22 1 24 1 48 3 
MENA 19 5 0 89 0 5 0 
N. America 32 6 9 44 16 22 3 
S. America 26 8 0 88 0 0 4 
a“MENA” is the Middle East and North Africa, “N.” is North and “S. is South. “Vol.” 
means a volumetric rate, “Flat” means a fixed charge, “I Block” means an increasing block 
structure, and “D Block” means a decreasing rate structure. 
Table 1. Municipal Tariff Structures 
The most common tariff structure is the increasing block structure reported by 50% of the 
systems. The increasing block structure gives water users divergent and inefficient signals 
for water conservation. Ninety-four percent of systems in Africa use increasing block 
structures and more than 88% use these structures in the MENA and South America. The 
high incidence in less developed regions is unfortunate both for efficiency and equity. 
Wasted water erodes already low incomes and increasing block tariffs have the most 
regressive consequences for the poor (Komives et al., 2005). Notably, the increasing block 
structure is much less common in Europe and North America.  
Efficient tariffs structures with volumetric and fixed charges are used in 20% of the systems 
surveyed. Almost half of the systems surveyed in Europe use efficient tariff structures. The 
high European incidence of efficient tariffs may reflect recent reforms reported by industry 
organizations (Beecher et al., 2005). Twenty-two percent of North American systems use an 
efficient structure. Efficient tariffs are least common in South America, MENA, Asia and 
Africa.  
Volumetric charges alone are common in Asia and Europe, with 41% of Asian systems 
reporting volumetric rates. Volumetric rates can offer efficient incentives for water 
conservation, but to do so, tariff revenues are not likely to equal financial costs. A tariff 
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based on an efficient volumetric rate alone risks financial insolvency. Flat and decreasing 
block structures are uncommon in the GWI data. The low incidence may reflect the nature of 
the sample. The sample is targeted to the largest systems worldwide and systems that are 
functioning adequately enough to respond to survey inquiries. Flat tariffs are the only 
alternative in the absence of water use metering and many water systems operate without 
such metering (Banerjee, 2008; World Health Organization & United Nations Children’s 
Fund, 2000).  
The incidence of tariff structures in smaller North American systems and towns also 
cautions extending the global survey results to all water systems. Beecher (2011) surveys 80 
water systems in the north central area of the United States and finds that 44% use 
decreasing block tariffs, 18% use increasing block tariffs, and no systems use efficient 
structures. Dziegielewski et al., (2004) finds that 35% of 426 water systems in Illinois use 
decreasing block structures, 4% use increasing block structures and only 1% use an efficient 
structure. In 12 larger water systems in Colorado, 44% use either a volumetric charge or an 
increasing block tariff, 12% use decreasing block tariffs and none use an efficient tariff 
structure (Western Resource Advocates, 2004). 
4.3 Water tariff levels set by municipal water systems 
Efficient tariff levels are set so that the volumetric charge is equal to the financial and non-
financial opportunity costs of providing an additional unit of water. Table 2 lists monthly 
average water rates based on the 2010 GWI survey. The second column in Table 2 lists 
income per capita within the systems responding to the survey. Overall, average income per 
capita is $20,595, but regional levels range from a low of $1,645 in Africa to a high of $48,119 
in North America. The average monthly charge per 1,000 gallons is $4.53 for water and $3.32 
for sewerage and wastewater. Sixty-four systems or almost 25% report no wastewater 
charge billed to water uses. The average combined water and wastewater charge is $7.08 per 
1,000 gallons of water use.  
 
Regiona 
Water 
Systems 
(#) 
Income per 
Capitab 
($) 
Water and Wastewater Charged 
($ per 1,000 gallons) 
Water Wastewater 
Water and 
Wastewater 
All 276 20,595 4.53 3.32 7.08 
Africa 18 1,645 2.09 0.70 2.79 
Asia 94 12,736 2.63 1.50 4.13 
Europe 87 35,722 7.82 3.83 11.65 
MENA 19 14,292 2.79 0.34 3.13 
S. America 32 8,513 3.01 0.90 3.91 
N. America 26 48,199 4.79 5.86 10.65 
a“MENA” is the Middle East and North Africa, “N.” is North and “S. is South. 
bIncome per capita is annual gross domestic product per capita for 2005. 
cIncreasing and decreasing block structures result in different charges for different use 
levels. The 2010 GWI data lists average charges for a use level of 15 cubic meters or 3,963 
gallons per month. 
Table 2. Level of Municipal Water System Tariffs 
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Water and wastewater rates vary noticeably over the listed regions. Water rates are highest 
in Europe and North America and lowest in Africa and Asia. The average water rate in 
Europe is more than three times the water rate in Africa. Wastewater rates are highest again 
in Europe and North America and lowest in Africa and MENA. Combined rates are less 
than average in Africa, MENA, South America and Asia. 
A standardized cost index allows a comparison of water rates relative to the revenue needed 
to cover operating, maintenance and capital costs (Komives et al., 2005). The index divides 
rates into the four categories shown in Table 3: insufficient or sufficient to cover operating 
and maintenance costs (O&M), sufficient to cover operating, maintenance and capital costs 
(O&M&C) and sufficient to cover costs in addition to minimum operating, maintenance and 
capital costs.  
Costs vary depending on local and regional differences in wages and other prices, so the 
index sets different rates for less and more developed countries. The index does not include 
a fourth category of “Sufficient for Additional Costs” for more developed countries, so this 
threshold was set at $9.00 in these countries, double the rate needed to cover standard 
operating, maintenance and capital costs. The analysis applies the four less developed 
country cost categories to systems where mean income per capita is less than $10,000 per 
year in the 2010 GWI survey. It applies the more developed cost categories to systems with 
income per capita more than $10,000 per year. 
Table 3 categorizes tariffs for the 121 systems in lower income regions, the 155 systems in 
higher income regions and all systems. Almost one-third of the tariffs in low-income regions 
and 8% of the tariffs in higher income areas are insufficient to cover only operating and 
maintenance costs. Fifty-seven percent of tariffs in developing countries are insufficient to 
cover the additional costs of capital. The data indicate that over all systems, only 14% 
recover revenue sufficient to cover more than standard operating, maintenance and capital 
costs with their current tariffs. This means that as many as 86% of the systems provide 
inadequate incentives for water conservation by failing to include non-financial opportunity 
costs.  
 
Context 
Insufficient for 
O & M a 
Sufficient for O 
& M a 
Sufficient for O 
& M & C a 
Sufficient for 
Additional 
Costs 
Less Developed Less than $0.9 $0.9 to $1.8 $1.8 to $4.5 Greater than $4.5 
More Developed Less than $1.8 $1.8 to $4.5 $4.5 to $9.0 Greater than $9.0 
Global Water Systems:     
Income < $10,000 (%) 31 26 36 7 
Income > $10,000 (%) 8 28 45 19 
All (%) 18 27 41 14 
a”O & M” is operating and maintenance cost and “O & M & C” is operating, maintenance 
and capital cost. 
Table 3. Cost Sufficiency of Municipal Water Rates 
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Figures 2 and 3 show that there is considerable variation in the adequacy of tariff levels 
within regions and countries as well. Much of the MENA is arid and the water opportunity 
costs are likely to be high. Figure 2 indicates that tariffs in 7 MENA systems are inadequate 
to cover operating and maintenance expenses, let alone encourage water conservation 
consistent with both financial and non-financial opportunity costs. Eleven MENA tariffs 
appear to cover financial costs to some degree. Six tariffs exceed standard financial costs. 
The rates in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Dubai appear high enough to include some portion of 
opportunity costs in addition to the immediate financial requirements of operation, 
maintenance and capital costs. 
Figure 3 shows that tariffs in the United States tend to recover operating and maintenance 
costs, but at least 11 of the 19 systems shown set tariffs that are insufficient to cover capital 
costs. Four low tariff systems—Dallas, Las Vegas, Denver and San Antonio--are in arid 
regions where the opportunity cost of water is high, yet their tariffs fail to match the 
standard index for normal financial costs. Six of the 19 systems set rates adequate for 
revenues in excess of standard financial costs. The tariff for one city, San Diego—also in an 
arid region—exceeds the $9 level where tariff revenue may include a portion of non-
financial water opportunity costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Municipal Water Rates, Middle East and North Africa ($ per 1000 gallons) 
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Fig. 3. Municipal Water Rates, United States ($ per 1000 gallons) 
5. Implementing efficient residential tariffs 
In many cities, large increases in water tariffs are likely to be required in order to encourage 
efficient water conservation. The amount of an increase in a particular water system 
depends on the current volumetric charge and the demand elasticities of water users. 
Dalhuisen et al. (2003) reports an average water demand elasticity of -0.4 in a review of 314 
elasticity estimates obtained in 64 different research studies. However, elasticities varied 
significantly across studies and cities, so water use in a particular city may be less or more 
responsive to price increases than indicated by the average elasticity (Dalhuisen et al., 2003). 
For example, the average elasticity of -.4 means that reducing water use by 10% requires a 
25% increase in a tariff volumetric charge. With a demand elasticity of -.1, reducing water 
use by 10% requires a 100% increase in a volumetric charge. 
Water users are likely to resist large and unexplained tariff increases. Client acceptance of 
efficient water tariffs requires explanation and public education regarding the real economic 
costs of water. In some cases, there may be advantages to implementing efficient tariffs on a 
delayed schedule in order to give water users time to adjust and adopt water-saving habits 
and technologies before sustaining higher prices.  
Three approaches to tariff reduce the financial impact of efficient water conservation 
incentives. The first approach is to use the efficient fixed charge to redistribute revenues in 
excess of financial costs. Tariffs based on unpaid, non-financial opportunity cost are certain 
to bring in surplus revenue above the revenue required to meet financial costs. Surplus 
revenue may be redistributed to water users through the fixed charge portion of the efficient 
tariff in a way that is consistent with fairness and equity concerns. As long as fixed charge 
rebates are not correlated with users’ volumetric payment, fixed charge rebates do not 
distort the tariff incentive for efficient water conservation. 
A second approach to increasing public acceptance of efficient water conservation incentives 
is to implement efficient tariffs for higher levels of water use and an inefficiently low tariff 
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with volumetric water conservation rebate for low volume users (Collinge, 1994). Water 
conservation rebates for low volume users communicate the efficient incentive for water use 
without changes in volumetric charges below a certain threshold of water use. The 
volumetric rebate need only be set to pay users the volumetric opportunity cost for reduced 
water use. The threshold that distinguishes low and high water use may be set for 
individual users based on some percentage of historical use or it may be set at the same level 
for all water users based on some other criteria, such as using all surplus revenue encourage 
water conservation.  
A two-tariff program combined conservation rebates may be structured in the following 
way. First, the volumetric charge is raised to an efficient level, ߣ∗, for water use in excess of 
the selected threshold for high water use. Second, for water use less than the threshold, the 
volumetric charge is set to ߣ଴, an amount less than ߣ∗. The lesser charge, ߣ଴, may leave 
unchanged an existing volumetric charge or it may be adjusted to some other level higher or 
lower than an existing volumetric charge. The only requirement is that ߣ଴ ≤ ߣ∗. The third 
step is to set a volumetric conservation rebate. The conservation rebate is equal to the 
difference between the efficient volumetric charge and the lower volumetric charge, ߣ∗ − ߣ଴.  
With the described charges and rebate in place, all water users face an efficient incentive for 
water conservation. Water users above the threshold pay the full opportunity cost, ߣ∗, on 
each unit of water used. When water users below the threshold use an additional unit of 
water, they give up the opportunity to earn the rebate, ߣ∗ − ߣ଴, on that unit of water and 
they pay the volumetric charge, ߣ଴. The net payment for an additional unit of water use 
below the threshold is composed of two parts, (i) the sacrifice of the rebate, ߣ∗ − ߣ଴, and (ii) 
the payment of the volumetric charge, ߣ଴. The sum of the sacrifice and volumetric charge is 
the opportunity cost of water use, the efficient incentive ߣ∗ = ሺߣ∗ − ߣ଴ሻ + ߣ଴.  
The two-tariff-and-rebate program gives all water users an efficient incentive for water 
conservation. Water users below the threshold have an additional incentive to accept the 
program since they may pay the current volumetric charge and have an opportunity to earn 
rebate income. Setting thresholds at the individual level based on historical water use gives 
all users the prospect of earning rebates. Hence, it may be possible to make almost all users 
better off by including unpaid opportunity costs in an efficient water conservation tariff 
program. 
A third approach requires no change in tariffs below a selected threshold of water use, but 
does require a physical infrastructure to transfer water between the residential water 
network and the next best alternative use. This is possible in regions such as the Rio Grande 
basin where both urban and agricultural water is stored and withdrawn from the same 
network of canals and storage reservoirs.  
The third approach is based on resale of water between residential water users and 
agricultural water users (Haddad, 2000). Similar to the tariff and rebate program, a water 
use threshold is set either for residential users as a group or for each user based on historical 
water use. In addition, a water savings account is set up for each user within the water 
networks billing and accounting system.  
Water users make deposits into the savings account by reducing their planned water use 
below the threshold selected by the water authority. The amount deposited is the difference 
between the selected threshold and the amount of water that an individual plans to use. 
Deposits can be made by telephone, by mail-in card or on the internet. The municipal 
system then acts as an agent for individual savers and sells the aggregate amount of 
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planned savings to agricultural users or in-situ agents. Sales revenues are returned to savers 
in proportion to their actual savings.  
Residential users pay the full opportunity cost of water in two situations. The first is when 
their water use exceeds the threshold selected by the water authority. The second, is when 
actual water saving is less than planned saving. Users that save less than they planned, 
pay the full opportunity cost of water on the difference between planned and actual 
savings. Apart from these two cases, users pay a volumetric rate that the water authority 
sets for water use that is below the threshold minus planned savings. Tariff charges for 
water use less than the threshold minus planned savings may remain at current inefficient 
rates.  
The third approach communicates efficient water conservation incentives to all residential 
water users. Users using more than the threshold amount of water face the full opportunity 
cost for an additional unit of water. Users below the threshold amount forego the 
opportunity to sell water at its opportunity cost to agricultural users when they fail to ‘save’ 
water. Each type of user has an incentive to invest in water conservation consistent with its 
value in the next best use. 
Like the two-tariff-and-rebate program, water savings accounts and resale give residential 
water users an opportunity to earn income from the true economic value of water. By setting 
appropriate thresholds at the level of an individual user, the income earning potential can 
be extended to all waters users. By saving water, users have the opportunity to converts 
financial pain into financial gain. Users thereby share the benefit of efficient water 
conservation.  
6. Conclusions 
Economic principles help identify the consequences of wasting scarce water. The 
opportunity cost concept shows wasting water is not just misguided. Wasting scarce water 
destroys real economic opportunities and leads to losses for other water users. The concept 
of water demand guides the measurement of water values, helps evaluate users’ responses 
to conservation policies, and shows how to measure the deadweight loss of inefficient water 
use as well as the benefits of water conservation. Analysis of water trading shows how trade 
gives water users strong incentives to find the highest value uses of water and to eliminate 
waste by moving water into those uses. Third-party effects remind us that water use has 
potential consequences elsewhere in the hydrological cycle, such as on in-situ and 
downstream users.  
The analysis used these economic principles to evaluate whether municipal water tariffs 
may be designed to encourage efficient water conservation. The analysis found that efficient 
water conservation tariffs have two parts, a volumetric charge that communicates the 
opportunity cost of an additional unit of water and a fixed charge that is adjusted at the user 
level to address equity and fairness and at the aggregate level to address revenue 
requirements not covered by the volumetric charge.  
Empirical analysis showed that municipal water systems across the globe are large 
reservoirs of wasted water. More than 80% of 276 large water systems worldwide use tariffs 
that encourage water waste. There is some evidence of tariff reform in Europe, but, even 
there, the majority of water systems use inefficient tariffs that encourage wasted water. 
More than 85% of the 276 systems set tariffs so low that they appear unlikely to recover 
capital costs. Forty-five percent of tariffs fail to cover likely operating and maintenance 
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costs. Systems in low-income cities appear most likely to use tariffs that disadvantage the 
poor, threaten financial viability and waste scarce and highly valued water.  
Overall, the tariffs used by cities around world suggest rather solemn prospects for many 
water systems: possible financial insolvency, reduced service quality and service areas, and 
abundant water waste. Efficient water conservation tariffs can contribute to financial 
solvency and unlock the reservoirs of wasted water. Water is scarce and highly valued. An 
efficient water tariff communicates the high value of water. 
Water users are likely to resist such communication in the form of unexplained increases in 
their water bills. Explanation and education campaigns are standard approaches to 
achieving clients’ acceptance of water conservation policies. There are also two ways to 
modify tariff programs so that users can share the gains obtained from efficient water 
conservation. The first approach is a two-tariff program with a water conservation rebate. 
This two-tariff program sets a high tariff charge for water use beyond a certain threshold 
and a low tariff for water use below the threshold. The threshold may be set for an 
individual user based on historical use or it may be a single threshold for all users in the 
system. The volumetric charge in the high tariff is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of 
water. The low tariff can be set at any lower volumetric charge, including being left 
unchanged from an existing rate.  
The conservation rebate equals the marginal opportunity cost of water. The rebate is paid to 
users based on water savings relative to the threshold—on the positive difference between 
threshold and the water a user actually uses. The two-tariff-and-rebate program presents all 
users with the full economic cost of using an additional unit of water. In contrast to an 
across-the-board tariff increase, users actually pay the full cost of water only on water use 
above the threshold. Water use below the threshold has a lower out-of-pocket cost, but the 
same opportunity cost. A user that fails to conserve below the threshold gives up both the 
rebate and volumetric charge on each additional unit of water use. Users above and below 
the threshold have a full and efficient incentive to invest in water conservation. 
The second approach is similar to the two-tariff-and-rebate program. Instead of a rebate, the 
second approach offers users water conservation savings accounts.  The savings accounts is 
an electronic entry maintained by the water systems billing and account system. Users make 
savings deposits by cutting back on water use. As savings accumulate, the water system 
sells saved water at its full opportunity cost to users outside the system, such as agricultural 
irrigators or trustees for environmental interests. Sales revenues are returned to savers in 
proportion to their water deposits. As in the two-tariff-and-rebate program, all water users 
face the full opportunity cost of an additional unit of water and each has an opportunity to 
earn income from water conservation.  
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